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In 2017, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency following the 
recommendation of the President’s Commission on Combatting Drug Addiction and the Opioid 
Crisis.1  Opioid abuse is one of the nation’s largest public health threats, as it takes the life of 
approximately 130 people per day.2  One reason that the opioid epidemic has escalated at the rates 
it has is because one in three Americans suffer from chronic pain, and consequently, acquire 
prescriptions for pain medication such as oxycodone and acetaminophen/hydrocodone.3  While 
these opioids are effective and sometimes necessary forms of pain management, they also are 
highly addictive, particularly when misused.4  
So how did we as a nation get to this point?  It has been said that the opioid epidemic has 
occurred in three waves.5  The first wave began in the 1990s when doctors increasingly and 
liberally began prescribing opioids to treat patients’ pain following reassurances from 
pharmaceutical companies that there was a low risk of addiction associated with the drugs.6  For 
example, Purdue Pharma, producer of OxyContin, spent hundreds of millions of dollars to 
aggressively market their drug to prescribers, touting this claim.7  The company sent salesmen out 
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across the company to distribute marketing and promotional materials for OxyContin, a tactic the 
US Drug Enforcement Agency claims was “unprecedented” for such a narcotic.8  Furthermore, 
Purdue sponsored various all-expense-paid conferences, attended by physicians, pharmacists, and 
nurses from across the country,  regarding pain management and the role of OxyContin in pursuing 
it.9  Adding fuel to the fire, a group of physicians, particularly the American Pain Society, began 
arguing the medical profession as a whole was failing to adequately treat pain due to “erroneous 
concerns about addiction.”10  The group accordingly urged for physicians to more generously 
prescribe opioids.11  This perfect storm convinced medical professionals, and the FDA, that 
OxyContin was safe for the long-term treatment of patients with chronic pain.12  Notwithstanding 
this belief, OxyContin’s skyrocketing sales⎯from $48 million in 1996 to $1.1 billion in 
2000⎯correlated with increased rates of abuse and addiction.13 
The second wave of the opioid epidemic began around 2010 once the addictive qualities of 
the drugs came to light, and remedial efforts to decrease opioid prescriptions began to take effect.14  
As prescriptions for opioids became harder to obtain, addicts began turning to heroin⎯a widely 
available alternative.15  In fact, 80% of heroin users admitted to using prescription opioids before 
resorting to heroin.16  Ultimately, deaths caused by heroin overdose increased by 286% from 2002 
to 2013.17 
 
8 Dan Mager, Where Did the Opioid Epidemic Come From? Part One of Two, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 21, 2017), 
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The third wave of the opioid epidemic began in 2013, when deaths related to synthetic 
opioids, such as fentanyl, sharply increased.18  Illicitly-manufactured fentanyl is often used to 
replace and model heroin when sold to unsuspecting users.19  In 2016, there were over 20,000 
deaths in the United States from fentanyl and related drugs.20 
New Jersey, in particular, has felt the crippling effects of the national opioid epidemic.  
Since 2004, New Jersey has experienced over 14,000 overdose deaths.21  Accordingly, drug 
overdose is the leading cause of accidentals deaths in the state, topping car accidents.22  
While the opioid epidemic is mainly considered a public health crisis, it is also fueled by 
criminal activity because people wrongly provide access to, sell, and purchase illicit opioids.  
Because selling opioids is so lucrative and the addictive qualities of the drugs are so strong, the 
opioid market is extremely prosperous.  While public health efforts are primarily used to minimize 
the effects of opioid addiction, the grim reality is that the crisis will not come to an end unless the 
criminal law is used, in conjunction with public health measures, to interrupt the market.   
This Comment will focus on New Jersey’s efforts to combat the opioid crisis using criminal 
law.  Part II of this Comment will explain and analyze the measures New Jersey has taken against 
each key player in the opioid epidemic—users, dealers, and prescribers.  Specifically, it will 
examine how criminal law has played a role in combatting the epidemic with respect to each key 
player.  Part III will provide a more in-depth analysis of where New Jersey went right and went 
wrong with its actions.  For where it went wrong, this comment will offer suggestions about how 
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the state can alter the ways in which it charges and prosecutes the key players in the opioid 
epidemic. 
II. Key Players in the Opioid Epidemic 
 
While there are many actors involved in the opioid epidemic, this Comment will focus on 
three key players: opioid users, dealers, and prescribers. This Section will detail how each player 
contributes to the crisis. It will further describe the actions New Jersey has taken, with respect to 
each player, in alleviating the effects of the opioid epidemic.  
A. Opioid Users 
 
Cristin was 18 years old the first time she took OxyContin.23  A doctor prescribed the pain 
medication to her in 1998 after she had injured her lower back in a car accident.24  After suffering 
from constant pain and hopelessness due to the ineffectiveness of physical therapy, Cristin took 
the pills as prescribed so she could continue working as a waitress.25  Cristin took the OxyContin 
for a full year before her doctor finally refused to refill her prescription, advising her she has been 
taking it for too long.26  He recommended a pain clinic in lieu of the pills to manage her pain.27 
Unfortunately, the clinic didn’t take her insurance and left Cristin seeking out an alternative that 
would allow her some relief from the pain.28  Time was limited because the withdrawal 
symptoms—vomiting and chills—were starting to introduce themselves.29  Then the answer to all 
her problems appeared when her boyfriend’s brother offered her a bit of heroin to try.30 Cristin 
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explained that she  “sniffed it at first, and it made all my sickness go away.”31  Cristin spent the 
majority of her 20s addicted to heroin and underwent the process of detoxing and relapsing 
repeatedly.32  
Cristin’s story is not uncommon.  Eighty percent of Americans facing heroin addiction 
admit that their addiction began with a legitimate prescription for pain killers, often from the 1990s 
or early 2000s when opioids were widely available.33  Once their supply of prescription pain killers 
is cut off, and they are unable to illicit another prescription, users often turn to heroin, an opioid 
that is easily obtainable on the street.34  This transition is not unusual because opioids are 
essentially a controlled, legal form of heroin.35  When taken incorrectly or in high doses, 
prescription painkillers have similar effects on the brain as heroin.36 When heroin enters the brain, 
it is converted to morphine.37  “The molecules then bind to the opioid receptors located in several 
areas of the brain, including the ones involved with perceptions of both pain and rewards.”38  
Heroin, ultimately, rewards users with a feeling of euphoria. Prescription opioids work in a similar 
way by “attaching to these same receptors found within the brain and reducing the perception of 
pain.”39  They can also cause the euphoric response when taken at higher doses.40 
 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Kayleen Egan, Comment, The Overdose Prevention Act: A Small Step When New Jersey Needs a Giant Leap, 12 
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2014); PRESCRIPTION OPIOIDS AND HEROIN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE 
6 (2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/node/pdf/19774/prescription-opioids-and-heroin. 
34 Egan, supra note 33, at 4; Katie Hiller, Heroin Deaths in NJ Three Times National Average, Whyy (Jul. 17, 2015), 
https://whyy.org/articles/heroin-deaths-in-nj-three-times-national-rate/. 
35 Egan, supra note 33, at 3. 
36 Shelby Leheny, The Connection Between Prescription Opioids and Heroin, PHARMACY TIMES (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/shelby-leheny-pharmd-candidate-2017/2016/09/the-connection-
between-prescription-opioids-and-heroin. 
37 Id.  
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Aside from accessibility, another factor that usually encourages a user’s transition from 
painkillers to heroin is that heroin is a cheaper alternative.41  Prescription painkillers typically cost 
between $25-$50 per pill, while heroin costs approximately $5-$20 per bag, or per single dose.42  
In New Jersey, the rate of heroin overdoses is three times the national average.43  Heroin-
related deaths now “eclipse homicide, suicide, car accidents, and AIDS as a cause of death in the 
state.”44  This could be attributed to the fact that heroin is apparently “pouring” into New Jersey 
through Port Elizabeth and Newark.45  Additionally, Bob Baxter, the former director of the needle 
exchange program in Newark, attributes this frightening reality to the “perfect storm of 
accessibility, affordability, and acceptability” when it comes to the deadly drug.46  This “perfect 
storm” has proven to be so catastrophic that even groups that are historically not at high risk for 
heroin addiction—women, Caucasians, the wealthy, and adults aged 18 to 25—have significantly 
contributed to the dramatic spikes in opioid abuse in recent years.47  In fact, over the last decade, 
treatment for opioids has been “spread evenly across all the state’s demographics.”48  Senator 
Joseph Vitale compares opioid addiction to alcoholism in that, “[a]lcoholism has long been 
acknowledged to exist across all socio-economic classes.  We accept that.  As a culture, we have 
to accept that drug addiction causes the same damage.  Until we acknowledge that, we'll never turn 
the corner.”49 
 
41 Egan, supra note 33, at 4.  
42 Id.; Thomas Christiansen & Sendra Yang, How Much is Heroin?, THE RECOVERY VILLAGE (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/heroin-addiction/how-much-is-heroin/. 
43 Stephen Stirling, N.J. Heroin Overdose Death Rate is Triple the Soaring U.S. Rate, NJ.COM (Jun. 8, 2015),  
https://www.nj.com/news/2015/07/nj_heroin_overdose_death_rate_is_triple_the_soarin.html. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; See e.g., Rodrigo Torrejon, About 1.6 Tons of Cocaine Seized at Port Newark, Largest Drug Bust in 25 Years, 
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Mar. 11, 2019, 9:44 AM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/new-jersey/2019/03/11/1-6-
tons-cocaine-seized-port-newark-largest-bust-25-years/3128185002/. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 Stirling, supra note 43. 
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This data has caught the New Jersey Legislature’s attention and spurred a more sympathetic 
attitude towards addiction.50  This sympathy is exemplified through New Jersey’s responses when 
it comes time to charge and prosecute illicit drug users.  Overall, it appears as though New Jersey’s 
focus is primarily on treating addiction; however, the state’s actions indicate that some 
accountability must remain with illicit drug users in order to curb the opioid epidemic.  
1. Immunity Statue 
Enacted as part of Governor Chris Christie’s Overdose Prevention Act, N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-
30 (2013) grants “immunity from liability,51 [in] certain circumstances, for persons seeking 
medical assistance for someone experiencing a drug overdose.”52  This immunity also applies to 
the individual experiencing the overdose, as well as those “working in collaboration” to request 
medical attention for that individual, meaning not just the person making the 911 call.53  This 
statute is one way New Jersey emphasizes treatment and exemplifies a sympathetic attitude to 
addiction, rather than focusing on accountability.  It was enacted with the purpose of encouraging 
people to seek help when someone is overdosing.54  It achieves this purpose by eliminating, from 
the person seeking help, the fear of being charged and prosecuted if they solicit aid from law 
enforcement or emergency medical services.55  
That being said, the immunity only applies if (1) the person seeking medical attention acts 
in good faith; (2) the person seeking medical attention does so for another person who is 
experiencing an overdose and is in need of medical assistance; and (3) the evidence for an arrest, 
charge, prosecution, conviction, or revocation was obtained as a result of seeking medical 
 
50 See id.  
51 Liability refers to drug charges in connection with an individual’s overdose.  Egan, supra note 33, at 5.  
52 N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-30 (2013).  
53 Egan, supra note 33, at 5 n.29, 16. 
54  Id. at 17.  
55 See N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-30 (2013). 
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assistance.56  It is important to note, however, that the statute does not grant immunity for 
distribution or intent to distribute.57  This statutory construction can be problematic because it is 
common for a drug dealer to use drugs with the individuals he or she sells to.58  Thus, if someone 
overdoses and their drug dealer calls for medical assistance, the dealer can still be charged with 
distribution or intent to distribute.59  It has been suggested that if New Jersey is serious about its 
goal of encouraging people to call for help when someone is experiencing an overdose, it must 
broaden its immunity statute to cover drug distribution or intent to distribute charges.60  
Alternatively, at the very least, it could allow consideration of the fact that the dealer sought out 
medical attention for someone experiencing an overdose as a mitigating factor in court.61 
Moreover, the immunity statute does not apply to concurrent crimes happening while 
someone is seeking medical attention for an individual who is overdosing.  For example, in 
Kentucky, a drug user was charged with endangering the welfare of others after he called to report 
an overdose.62  Apparently, the fentanyl that was present on the overdose victim’s body was so 
potent that it seeped into the responding paramedic’s skin and made him ill.63  Kentucky has an 
immunity statute that similarly does not apply to other crimes that may occur at the scene of the 
overdose.64  While broadening the immunity statute to cover all unrelated crimes happening at the 
scene of the overdose may be beyond reason, the statute should be expanded to at least cover 
crimes rationally related to the overdose.  This would prevent the statute from being “diluted” and 
 
56 Id.  
57 See Id.  
58 Egan, supra note 33, at 12.  
59 See § 2C:35-30. 
60 Egan, supra note 33, at 12. 
61 Id.  
62 Albert B. Kelly, With Lives at Stake, Don’t Dilute Good Samaritan Overdose Laws, NJ.COM (Jul 8, 2019), 
https://www.nj.com/opinion/2019/07/with-lives-at-stake-dont-dilute-good-samaritan-overdose-laws-opinion.html 
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64 See Id.  
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the state from using “work-arounds” to charge people for crimes not explicitly covered in the 
statute.65 
2. Operation Helping Hand  
In June 2019, Attorney General Gurbir Grewal and the Office of the New Jersey 
Coordinator for Addiction Responses and Enforcement Strategies (“NJ CARES”) announced that 
over two million dollars of state funds would be allocated to establishing and expanding a county-
based diversion program called “Operation Helping Hand.”66  Operation Helping Hand entails 
one-week stints during which law enforcement proactively assists individuals in obtaining 
treatment once it has been determined that they suffer from opioid addiction.67  To date, eighteen 
counties already have participated in Operation Helping Hand.68   In regards to the program, 
Grewal says, “Operation Helping Hand represents a different kind of policing, where the goal is 
not to rack up arrests but to offer individuals using illicit drugs the help they need to break the 
cycle of addiction.”69 
The logistics of the program are as follows: it begins with law enforcement arresting an 
individual for purchasing opioids, usually heroin, in an open-air market.70  When the individual is 
brought to the police station for processing, recovery specialists are already there waiting to 
connect that individual with options for treatment services.71  While the charges are not ultimately 
dropped against the individual, the particular prosecutor’s office makes every effort to “place him 
 
65 Id.   
66 Anthony Vecchione, ‘Operation Helping Hand’ gets $2.2M boost for diversion program expansion, NJBIZ (Jun. 
20, 2019), https://njbiz.com/operation-helping-hand-gets-2-2m-boost-diversion-program-expansion/. 






or her on the path to recovery.”72  Often, judges are made aware of the individuals who accepted 
treatment, which can be used as a mitigating factor in sentencing.73  
Operation Helping Hand has thus far been successful in encouraging people into treatment 
after they have been arrested and charged.  For example, during one week in June 2018, five 
counties made a collaborative effort to get those who were arrested on low-level drug charges into 
treatment.74  Out of the 177 individuals who were arrested, 80% accepted the offered treatment.75  
The offered treatment included an opportunity to speak to a recovery specialist, and depending on 
the severity of one’s addiction, access to a treatment facility.76  
Another success story from the program belongs to Cliffside Park resident, Matt Albanese, 
a seven-year addict who was charged with heroin possession during Bergen County’s Operation 
Helping Hand campaign in April 2017.77  Albanese and a friend had just purchased and shot three 
bags worth of heroin when a police officer pulled his Jeep over.78  This was Albanese’s second 
arrest in one week.79  This arrest was different from his previous ones over the years: this time, 
Albanese was persuaded into a detox program at Bergen Regional Medical Center as a part of 
Operation Helping Hand.80  As of January 2018, nine months later, Albanese was still clean.81 
 
72 Vecchione, supra note 6666. 
73 Steve Janoski, Prosecutor: Recovery Program Helped Disrupt Addiction, NORTHJERSEY.COM (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/crime/2018/01/04/prosecutor-says-operation-helping-hand-helped-disrupt-
cycle-addiction-some/990732001/. 
74 Stephen Johnson, New Jersey’s ‘Operation Helping Hand’ Offers Treatment, Not Stigma, To Arrested Drug Users, 
BIG THINK (Jun. 28, 2018), https://bigthink.com/stephen-johnson/operation-helping-hand-80-of-arrested-drug-users-
in-nj-accept-free-treatment-in-experimental-program. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Janoski, supra note 73. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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Albanese explains that the arrest was the “kick in the teeth he needed,” and was “a blessing in 
disguise.”82  
Attorney General Grewal commented, “[t]he way I measure success is if we break the cycle 
for one person.”83  He says, “[t]hat’s one less potential overdose, that’s one less potential death. 
And I think we’ve seen that happen here.”84  Stories like Albanese’s are an indication the program 
is working, considering Bergen County “didn’t go a day without a heroin arrest, an overdose, or . 
. . a Narcan save” in 2016.85 
3. Drug Courts 
It is believed that some type of punishment for those with drug convictions is necessary to 
protect society because, despite drug use being illegal in and of itself, “drugs are widely believed 
to be causally related to violent crimes such as robbery, theft, or assault.”86  On the other hand, it 
is also widely believed that drug usage and addiction are often just expressions of mental health 
problems, which calls for treatment.87  Thus, New Jersey has implemented drug courts which 
“straddle the criminal and health aspects of drug offenses.”88 
A drug court program is a specialized form of probation given to individuals who are facing 
prison-time, but “whose crimes were motivated by drug addiction.”89  There are three main factors 
that determine if an individual is eligible for drug court: an individual must (1) be 18 years or 
 
82 Id.  
83 Janoski, supra note 73. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  
86 Stephen Hunter et al., New Jersey Developments: New Jersey’s Drug Courts: A Fundamental Shift from the War 
on Drugs to a Public Health Approach for Drug Addiction and Drug-Related Crime, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 795, 818 
(2012).  
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Daniel M. Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, New Jersey Drug Court: Can Drug Court Help You Turn Your Life 
Around?, https://www.danielmrosenberg.com/practice-areas/criminal-defense/drug-crimes/drug-court/. 
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older; (2) suffer from substance abuse; and (3) be facing charges for a non-violent crime.90  The 
purpose of drug courts is to reduce crime by changing and shaping a defendant’s behavior.91  It 
does so by allowing a defendant, in exchange for a guilty plea, to be diverted to drug court program 
instead of traditional probation or short-term incarceration.92  The drug court program is then 
geared towards helping individuals obtain treatment for their addiction and preventing their further 
involvement in the legal system.93  If a person does not complete the drug court program, then they 
are required to serve their original sentence, whether it be probation or prison.94  
A typical drug court program entails regular court appearances and meetings with 
probation officers; random drug testing; residential programs, outpatient programs, and/or 
counseling; relapse prevention programs; community service; and more.95  Accordingly, drug 
court programs, like Operation Helping Hand, strike a balance between holding drug users 
accountable while still prioritizing rehabilitation over incarceration.  One of drug courts’ main 
goals is to help those suffering from addiction get into treatment.96  At the same time, drug court 
programs remain a punishment in a sense because they can be a “burdensome or painful expression 
of public censure by a legitimate authority.”97  While compulsory treatment and extensive 
monitoring may be preferable to prison, they can still be considered an onerous deprivation of 
liberty.98  Drug courts can thus be seen as “a hybrid of public health law and criminal law 
 
90 Id. 
91 Adult Drug Courts: Evidence Indicates Recidivism Reductions and Mixed Results for Other Outcomes,” 
Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-219, 3 (Feb. 2005), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf 
92  Id.  
93 Rosenberg & Associates, LLC, supra note 8989. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 See Adult Drug Courts: Evidence Indicates Recidivism Reductions and Mixed Results for Other Outcomes, supra 
note 9191.  
97 Hunter et al., supra note 8686, at 819.  
98 Id.  
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because drug courts have incorporated successful public health strategies into the criminal law to 
achieve better outcomes, such as reduced recidivism . . . and the optimization of public safety.”99  
B. Opioid Dealers 
Where there is a demand, there is a supply.  Drug cartels have noticed the uptick in opioid 
addiction over the past two decades, and have strategically entered the growing market to fill a 
specific need⎯a cheap alternative to prescription pills, namely heroin.100  It is no coincidence that 
the increased use of heroin in the United States correlates with heroin’s increased availability.101  
This widespread availability of heroin is fueled by the increased production and trafficking of 
heroin by Mexican criminal networks, which are responsible for the majority of heroin present in 
the United States.102  “Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) ‘remain the greatest 
criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge 
them.’”103  TCOs typically smuggle heroin into the United States through legal ports of entry often 
using privately owned vehicles and tractor trailers.104  They also form relationships with U.S. gangs 
to facilitate the distribution and sale of heroin in the United States.105  Distribution of heroin and 
other drugs is typically the main source of revenue for these gangs.106  Charging and prosecuting 
these traffickers falls primarily under federal law;107 however, once the drugs get into the hands of 
mid and low-level dealers for purposes of distribution, state criminal law often comes into play.  
When it comes to how New Jersey is utilizing the criminal law to deter opioid distribution, 
the state’s biggest misstep is how it charges and prosecutes low-level opioid dealers, particularly 
 
99 Id. at 796.  
100 Christiansen & Yang, supra note 42. 
101 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2019). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 2 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 3.  
106 Id.  
107 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 101101, at 5–6. 
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when a death results.  The enmity that law enforcement and prosecutors feel towards dealers is not 
altogether unjustified; however, the force with which they go after many low-level dealers might 
be misguided.  At the root of this problem is a powerful drug called fentanyl, which is driving the 
third and current wave of the opioid epidemic. 
1. Fentanyl 
A major problem that the state is facing is the use of a drug called fentanyl, which is more 
powerful, cheaper, and more accessible than heroin.108  It is common for opioid dealers, 
specifically low or mid-level dealers, to mix fentanyl with heroin and sell it to unsuspecting 
buyers.109  Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that is “fifty times more potent than heroin” and “one 
hundred times more so than morphine.”110  In fact, it is so dangerous that “law enforcement, public 
health workers, and first responders who unknowingly come into contact with it—absorbed 
through the skin or through accidental inhalation of airborne powder—can be put at serious 
risk.”111  
Because fentanyl is so cheap, it makes dealing it a much more lucrative endeavor than 
dealing heroin.112  While some users seek out fentanyl, many unknowingly ingest it when a dealer 
underhandedly mixes it in and misrepresents the end product as pure heroin.113  Fentanyl can easily 
be disguised as white-powder heroin or as a core ingredient in fake prescription pills.114 Using 
fentanyl is so profitable for dealers that doing so justifies the risk of losing a loyal customer to a 
 
108 Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate Stith, Symposium, Law and the Opioid Crisis: Fentanyl: A Whole New World?, 46 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 314, 314 (2018). 
109 Id. at 315.  
110 Id. at 314.  
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 315.  
113 Id.  
114 Rothberg & Stith, supra note 108108, at 315. 
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potential overdose because of it.115  Consequently, fentanyl often plays a role in overdoses and 
subsequent prosecutions of dealers in drug-induced homicide cases.116 
2. Strict Liability for Drug-Induced Homicides 
In 2013, Matthew Weisholz, a man who considered himself a “full-blown addict,” supplied 
his ex-girlfriend, Erin Idone, with heroin and a needle.117  Idone, an addict herself, injected the 
heroin in Weisholz’s presence and subsequently died of an overdose.118  Weisholz was charged 
and convicted of drug-induced homicide under New Jersey’s strict liability law.119  
New Jersey Statute 2C:35-9 provides that “[a]ny person who manufactures, distributes or 
dispenses methamphetamine . . . or any other controlled dangerous substance classified in 
Schedules I or II . . . is strictly liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation or 
ingestion of that substance, and is guilty of a crime of the first degree.”120  The statute also provides 
that it “shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to 
his own death by his purposeful, knowing, reckless or negligent injection, inhalation or ingestion 
of the substance, or by his consenting to the administration of the substance by another.”121  Lastly, 
it provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to preclude or limit any prosecution 
for homicide.”122 
Because the statute does not denote any mens rea term, and instead specifies strict liability, 
it follows that a drug dealer may end up with a homicide (murder or manslaughter) charge, 
 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUG-INDUCED HOMICIDE LAWS ARE 
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE 32 (2017), 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/dpa_drug_induced_homicide_report_0.pdf. 
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 N.J. Stat. § 2C:35-9 (2018) (emphasis added). 
121 Id.  
122 Id.  
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regardless of his or her intent to harm the user.  Furthermore, it is significant to note that those 
found responsible for drug-induced deaths are guilty of a first-degree crime.  In New Jersey, first-
degree crimes “are the most serious criminal offense[s] that one might commit” and carry a 
minimum prison term of 10 to 20 years.123  In comparison, a typical distribution charge that does 
not result in death is usually a second or third-degree crime, which carries a 5 to 10 or 3 to 5-year 
prison term, respectively.124 
The original intent of New Jersey’s strict liability statute was to provide prosecutors with 
a means to go after upper-level drug dealers “who could rarely be connected to the drugs.”125 
However, this statute has not been used for its intended purpose.126  For example, in the early 
2000s, New Jersey prosecuted thirty-two drug-induced homicide cases.127  Out of those cases, 
twenty-five did not involve the prosecution of those considered high-level dealers.128 Instead, the 
prosecutions targeted friends and family members who provided drugs to the decedent.129  Many 
prosecuted under strict liability drug-induced homicide statutes suffer from addiction, 
themselves.130   
In State v. Maldonado, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of § 
2C:35-9.131  The defendant in this case obtained heroin for a friend as a favor, receiving no 
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compensation.132  When the friend was found dead the next day from an overdose, the defendant 
plead guilty under § 2C:35-9 and was sentenced to prison for fifteen years.133 
Prosecutions of this sort even include cases of friends and significant others sharing drugs, 
rather than someone providing drugs to another.134  It is quite clear from these circumstances that 
there was never an intention for anyone to get hurt.  In fact, “some defendants had tried to save the 
life of the victims by calling 911, attempting C.P.R. or administering naloxone, an overdose-
reversal medication.”135  Ultimately, that does not matter; prosecutors need only prove that the 
defendant “provided the drugs or helped the victim obtain them,” not that the death was 
intentional.136  Furthermore, many of the drug-induced homicide prosecutions have recently been 
driven by the spike in fentanyl-related overdose deaths.137  It is often the case that family, friends, 
and sometimes even low-level street dealers are unaware when fentanyl has been added to the 
heroin.138  
Some believe these vigorous prosecutions will help deter drug use and allow those 
suffering from addiction to “hit bottom,” which will ultimately provide them with the motivation 
they need to seek treatment.139  Others view these prosecutions as a way to solace grieving families 
by punishing the wrongdoer.140  The latter is a legitimate interest of the state. One prosecutor 
justified the prosecutions by saying, “I look at it in a real micro way. You owe me for that dead 
kid.”141  While the state does need to hold suppliers accountable, a strict liability homicide charge 
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is not the way to do it, particularly because this method has proven to be overly punitive and 
unsuccessful in deterring drug deals.  
For instance, Ocean County brings the majority of the drug-induced homicide charges in 
New Jersey.142  Former Ocean County prosecutor, Joseph Coronato, was a proponent of 
investigating and bringing drug-induced homicide charges—in a two-year period while Coronato 
was in office, there were eighteen arrests using the charge.143  The office remembers only one 
drug-induced homicide arrest prior to Coronato’s arrival.144  Coronato calls the strict liability drug-
induced homicide statute his “checkmate statute” due to the ease in which the homicide unit can 
gather evidence to support a strict liability charge.145  He also “views drug-induced homicide as 
an effective tool for combatting the overdose crisis” because it allows him to send a “signal loud 
and clear.”146 
Despite Coronato’s efforts, overdose rates in Ocean County have steadily increased.147  He 
himself admits that overdose fatalities continue to “spiral out of control” in Ocean County as well 
as in the rest of New Jersey.148   What is the reason for this?   The answer points to the strong 
market for opioids.  
[D]rugs are cheaper, stronger, and more widely available than at any other time in 
US history.  Supply follows demand, so the supply chain for illegal substances is 
not eliminated because a single seller is incarcerated, whether for drug-induced 
homicide or otherwise.  Rather, the only effect of imprisoning a drug seller is to 
open the market for another one.  Research consistently shows that neither 
increased arrests nor increased severity of criminal punishment for drug law 
violations results in less use (demand) or sales (supply).  In other words, punitive 
sentences for drug offenses have no deterrent effect.149 
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What punitive statutes may have a deterrent effect on, though, is the “seeking of life-saving 
medical assistance.”150  The people who are positioned to save the life of an individual 
experiencing an overdose often happen to be the ones who provided that individual with drugs.  
Accordingly, those people might be hesitant to call 911 if they know they could be charged with 
homicide if the person overdosing ultimately dies.151  And they may not be immune from liability 
for calling 911 under New Jersey’s immunity statute because the statute does not cover distribution 
charges, particularly when a death results.152  This happened to Jennifer Marie Johnson, who called 
911 to seek medical help for her husband who was overdosing on the methadone she provided 
him.153  Her husband ultimately died, and Johnson is currently serving a six-year prison sentence 
for drug-induced homicide.154  The act of vigorously prosecuting and making examples out of 
people who provide drugs to others may ultimately lead to a “chilling effect on calling for medical 
attention” and thus lead to more fatal overdoses.155  
C. Opioid Prescribers 
Due to various competing interests, it appears New Jersey’s biggest challenge is charging 
and prosecuting physicians in connection with the opioid epidemic.  While it is no easy task, New 
Jersey should consider ramping up its actions against opioid prescribers, as they are often the root 
cause of many peoples’ struggle with addiction.  Previous New Jersey Attorney General, 
Christopher Porrino, said, “[d]octors who act like drug dealers and illegally dole out prescriptions 
for these highly addictive painkillers are nothing more than drug pushers in white coats, and they 
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are even more dangerous than a street dealer, because we trust that our doctors will protect our 
health and not hurt or kill us.”156 
A few common ways in which physicians have contributed to the opioid epidemic through 
illegal conduct are by prescribing, or overprescribing, opioids without a legitimate medical 
purpose and by operating “pill mills.”157  The operation of a pill mill is a common scheme in which 
doctors will exchange pills for cash, without administering any medical care.158  For example, in 
2017, a New Jersey doctor and sixteen others were caught operating a state-wide drug ring, which 
entailed the distribution of thousands of opioid pills including Oxycodone.159  The doctor allegedly 
“sold prescriptions for cash to the ring of 16 drug dealers, writing fraudulent prescriptions for 
individuals who had no legitimate medical need for the highly addictive pills.”160  He was charged 
with second-degree distribution of narcotics.161  
Another way in which physicians have fueled the opioid epidemic is by improperly 
prescribing opioids to unwitting patients who do not necessarily require them.162  For example, a 
New Jersey family physician, Vivienne Matalon, prescribed a powerful painkiller called Subsys 
to three of her patients, one of whom died.163  Subsys is a drug so powerful and the risks of 
addiction and overdose are so great that the Food and Drug Administration has approved its use 
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only for cancer patients who suffer from intense pain.164  Sarah Fuller didn’t have cancer; she 
suffered from painful fibromyalgia, yet Matalon prescribed her Subsys anyway.165  Fuller ended 
up dying from the “adverse effects of the drug” because it was prescribed to her for “off-label 
conditions.”166  While it is not illegal to prescribe drugs for off-label conditions, doing so may 
raise ethical concerns, particularly when risky opioids are involved.167  It is unclear what Matalon’s 
motivation for prescribing the Subsys was; however, it has been revealed that the pharmaceutical 
company that produced Subsys was orchestrating a scheme in which they paid doctors bribes in 
exchange for prescribing the drug.168  Consequently, the drug was prescribed to an “inappropriately 
broad array of pain patients,” many of whom did not need it.169  The State Board of Medical 
Examiners revoked Mantalon’s license for jeopardizing the welfare of her patients.170  Matalon 
faced no criminal charges and is eligible to seek reinstatement of her license in 2020.171 
In response to the troubling circumstances surrounding questionable and illegal physician 
activity, New Jersey has enacted some of the strictest regulations in the country in regards to 
painkiller prescriptions.172  On February 15, 2017, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey signed 
legislation aimed at aggressively addressing the opioid epidemic.173  Part of that legislation 
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restricts initial opioid prescriptions to a five-day supply.174  If a patient feels his or her pain has not 
subsided, the law allows the physician to add another five days to the prescription.175 When these 
restrictions are violated, there are two enforcement options against prescription providers—license 
suspension with no criminal sanctions or indictment and trial.176  When criminal charges are 
pursued, they usually are for “fraud or illegally prescribing controlled substances.”177 Due to the 
current epidemic, however, some prosecutors have even brought manslaughter and felony murder 
charges against physicians.178  
While New Jersey is off to a good start, it is imperative that the state ramp up its 
prosecutions of doctors who are involved in dishonest schemes, such as the ones mentioned above 
if it wants to make progress in combating the opioid crisis.  “When four out of five new heroin 
users are getting their start by abusing prescription drugs, you have to attack the problem at ground 
zero—in irresponsibly run doctors' offices,” previous Attorney General Porrino said.179  Not only 
should the state ramp up prosecutions to get to the root of the problem, but it should do so because 
of how especially heinous it is for licensed doctors to profit off of opioid addiction and do so based 
on the trust society places in them. 
On the other hand, it is understandable why New Jersey is struggling to vigorously 
prosecute doctors when there are many factors that may contribute to illegitimate prescriptions.  
For example, doctors, themselves, may be victims of patient dishonesty or “doctor shopping.”  
Doctor shopping is the practice of seeing various doctors to find someone willing to write a 
prescription for painkillers and/or visiting various doctors to get multiple prescriptions for 
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painkillers at one time.180  While electronic health records have helped combat this form of deceit, 
not every doctor’s office is equipped with such a system.181  Patients may also flat-out lie about 
the persistence and severity of their pain. 
In a 2003 survey, prosecutors found deceptive patients to be the most prominent factor in 
illegitimate prescriptions, followed by dishonest doctors.182  “Labeling physicians as 
misprescribers for merely being fooled is improper. [P]hysicians have inappropriately faced 
sanctions simply for being fooled.”183  In fact, recent studies have indicated how easy it actually 
is for patients to fake pain.184  Researchers found that, even after receiving training, people could 
not “detect real versus faked pain more than fifty-five percent of the time.”185  Accordingly, it is 
difficult enough to attach malpractice liability to a doctor who was fooled, let alone criminal 
liability.186 
Moreover, pharmaceutical companies and their fraudulent marketing practices have played 
a role in the manipulation of doctors, as well.  For instance, Purdue Pharma marketed its opioid 
analgesic as “less likely than other pain medications to cause abuse, addiction, tolerance, and 
withdrawal.”187  Accordingly, physicians were deliberately misinformed about the addictive 
tendencies of the drug they were prescribing.188  
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Lastly, another countervailing consideration that the state needs to keep in mind is that 
increased scrutiny on physicians may also lead to a chilling effect whereby doctors are hesitant to 
prescribe pain medication to patients who really need it.  This could lead to patients’ pain going 
untreated, forcing them to turn to the illicit drug market.  
III. Is New Jersey Heading in the Right Direction? 
In evaluating how New Jersey is using criminal law to combat the opioid epidemic within 
the state, it is best to consider its actions towards each key player, individually. With regard to how 
the state charges and prosecutes opioid users, New Jersey is on the right track by emphasizing 
treatment, while maintaining that illegal opioid users should retain some form of accountability.   
Decriminalizing the use of dangerous, illicit drugs altogether, and thus putting the focus entirely 
on treatment, may not be enough to give people the incentive they need to get help.  A harsh reality 
is that sometimes addicts must “hit rock bottom” before they are fully incentivized to seek 
treatment.   It is better that an addict’s “rock bottom” be an arrest than a life-threatening overdose.  
On the other hand, incarceration without treatment will not be effective at combatting the opioid 
epidemic either.  Addiction is a brain disorder that cannot be solved when someone is sitting behind 
bars.189  Often times, prison sentences exacerbate the problem. Those who have recently been 
released from prison are forty times more likely to overdose than someone in the general public.190   
Operation Helping Hand and Drug Courts are thus successful initiatives that allow 
prosecutors and law enforcement to find a healthy balance holding people accountable for their 
illegal conduct, while ultimately prioritizing rehabilitation over incarceration.191  In regard to 
Operation Helping Hand, the fact that drug charges are not dropped shows that New Jersey is still 
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utilizing and applying the criminal law uniformly to ensure there are consequences in place for 
those who engage in the purchase and use of illegal drugs.  That being said, by coaxing drug users 
into treatment post-arrest, the state recognizes that addiction is ultimately a disease that requires 
rehabilitation, rather than just punishment.  This program strikes a balance between holding users 
accountable while recognizing that rehabilitation is necessary.  
One could argue that by not dropping the drug charges, the state will ultimately undermine 
its goals of promoting rehabilitation.  This is due to the fact that having a criminal history could 
hurt one’s chances of securing a job once he or she is clean.  If recovering addicts have difficulties 
finding work, it is often the case that they resort back to their old ways of using drugs.  Though, 
as mentioned previously, sentencing judges are often made aware of who is obtaining treatment, 
which can be used as a mitigating factor during sentencing.192  Also, alternatives to prison time, 
such as Drug Courts, can help alleviate this concern, especially for non-violent illicit drug users.  
Lastly, sometimes “punishments” that distance users from not only the drugs themselves but also 
the people who encourage drug use may be necessary to further rehabilitative goals.  
The New Jersey immunity statue also shows that the State is taking a step in the right 
direction when it comes to encouraging people to call for help when someone is experiencing an 
overdose.  That being said, its purpose may be hindered due to the fact that whether or not someone 
is granted immunity from being charged often turns on arbitrary details.  Consider the following 
example:  
John, George, and Pete are using drugs one night. Later that night, after Pete went 
home, John overdoses.  George calls the authorities in order for John to receive 
proper medical attention.  If police officers legally seized all of the drug 
paraphernalia, they could not use it to incriminate John or George.  After all, the 
Overdose Prevention Act shields John (because he is the one who overdosed) and 
George (because he witnessed the overdose and made the call).  However, if the 
authorities could link the chain of evidence to Pete, they could arrest him for drug 
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possession.  Why?  Pete left and never witnessed the overdose or made the 911 
call.193 
 
This example exemplifies how the state can work around the statue to secure convictions against 
people at the scene, or involved in some way, with the overdose.  While people like Pete do not 
necessarily further the goal of the immunity statute, namely encouraging people to call for help 
when others are overdosing, the fact that the state may still prosecute Pete indirectly hinders the 
statute’s goals.  If people are aware of how the statute operates and that it turns on these arbitrary 
deals, they may not be as inclined to call for help in fear of being charged, or causing a friend to 
be charged, with some offense.  Accordingly, as mentioned in the previous Section, the New Jersey 
Immunity Statute should be broadened to alleviate this effect.  
The state’s biggest deficiency is how it is handling the prosecutions of particular opioid 
dealers, specifically when a fatality results.  The strict liability drug-induced homicide statute 
should be set aside because of the ineffective and unjust results that stem from it.   Not only is the 
statute overly punitive, but it has also failed to generate the deterrent effect originally intended.  
Instead, it is often used to target low-level drug dealers, and impose the stiffest of penalties without 
addressing the root of the epidemic.   
The rhetoric surrounding drug-induced homicide laws is that “the drug-supply is controlled 
by shady cartel figures and ruthless dealers who are stationed on American street corners.”194  
Thus, many believe that if an overdose occurs, strict and punitive measures are warranted. In 
reality, though, people who supply drugs to those who overdose are often friends or family 
members, and often use drugs themselves.195  New Jersey legislation fails to capture this nuance. 
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  Additionally, the availability of this statute may be a vehicle for prosecutors to act on their 
implicit biases.  Street dealers have more unfavorable stigmas attached to them than doctors, and 
prosecutorial discretion may lead to the state going after street dealers more aggressively solely 
for this reason.  Further, it has been said that drug-induced homicide laws “represent a return to 
the outdated ‘war on drugs’ approach,” which disproportionately affects communities of color.196  
And because fentanyl-related overdose deaths have sharply increased for people of color, we can 
expect drug-induced homicide laws to disproportionately and negatively those communities once 
again.197 Accordingly, to avoid these consequences, New Jersey should eliminate its strict liability, 
drug-induced homicide statute.  
In terms of prosecuting physicians, New Jersey is off to a good start; however, additional 
changes could still be made.  Since the 1990s, physicians have played a core role in bringing about 
and fueling the opioid epidemic.198  While many physicians at the time were deceived from 
pharmaceutical companies’ aggressive marketing tactics, virtually every physician is now 
informed of the dangerous and addictive qualities of prescription painkillers.  Accordingly, New 
Jersey should focus more of its resources on vigorously prosecuting the root of the problem, 
physicians, when they engage in illegal practices, rather than on low-level dealers and opioid users.   
Currently, while some doctors are being charged criminally, most are simply losing their licenses 
from the state licensing board.   It is important for New Jersey prosecutors to carefully analyze 
each actor’s level of culpability when determining what charges they will pursue and what 
sentences they will seek.  This may seem like a simple solution, but sometimes only a thin line 
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holding physicians and other players in the opioid epidemic similarly accountable for similar levels 
of culpability.  New Jersey has recently fallen short in this respect.   For example, Vivienne 
Matalon’s license was revoked, but no criminal charges were filed against her, despite the fact she 
may have accepted bribes and knowingly prescribed a dangerous opioid when she knew it was 
most likely not appropriate for her patient.  Matalon seems more deserving of a harsher penalty 
than someone like Jennifer Marie Johnson, who shared drugs with her husband and attempted to 
save his life when he subsequently overdosed.  
IV. Conclusion 
Overall, New Jersey has utilized the criminal law in various ways to combat the opioid 
epidemic: immunity statutes, Operation Helping Hand, drug courts, strict liability drug-induced 
homicide statutes, and more.  While the state is primarily heading in the right direction, there is 
room for improvement in certain areas.  Ultimately, the state should reassess how it prosecutes 
each key play and tailor its actions towards targeting root of the problem.  If it does that, New 
Jersey can successfully use the criminal law to mitigate the effects of the opioid epidemic.  
 
 
